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EXAMINER

FREDMAN, JEFFREY NORMAN

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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1637

DATE MAILED: 04/25/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

# Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/032,996

Applicant(s)

BOTSTEIN ET AL.

Examiner

Jeffrey Fredman

Art Unit

1637

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

## Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

## Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on March 8, 2005.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

## Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 27-35, 37-40 and 46-54 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 27-35, 37-40 and 46-54 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

## Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

## Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- \* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

## Attachment(s)

- 1) ☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date \_\_\_\_\_.
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. \_\_\_\_\_.
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

## **DETAILED ACTION**

### ***Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114***

1. A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on March 8, 2005 has been entered.

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101***

2. 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

3. Claims 27-35, 37-40 and 46-54 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention lacks patentable utility.

The current claims are drawn to a genus of nucleic acids which encode a protein termed Pro-539 (SEQ ID NO: 7) or portions thereof, in the specification, which have at least 95% amino acid sequence identity to SEQ ID NO: 7.

### **Credible Utility**

Following the requirements of the Utility Guidelines (See: Federal Register: December 21, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 244), revised guidelines for Utility.), the first inquiry is whether a credible utility is cited in the specification for use of the proteins. The cited utilities in the specification include overexpression in cancer. These utilities are credible.

Upon identification of credible utilities, the next issue is whether there are any well established utilities for the PRO 539 polypeptide. A review of the specification and of the prior art finds no well established utilities for unknown proteins whose activity, whose enzymatic or other biochemical function and whose cellular roles are entirely unknown and undisclosed in the specification.

The next inquiry is whether there are substantial or specific utilities for the PRO 539 protein of SEQ ID NO: 7 which are identified in either the specification or in the prior art.

### **Substantial utility**

Here, the evidence in the specification provided is that the nucleic acid which encodes the PRO 539 protein is overexpressed in cancer cells. The level of overexpression of PRO 539 was minimal, not even a two fold overexpression in any cell type. Further, no statistical data was presented to show that the overexpression was significant in any way, with no P-value or other statistical measure to demonstrate that the overexpression was a real effect and not simply produced by chance.

This data further lacks any of the hallmarks of utility because the overexpression of the nucleic acid is not relevant to the utility of the protein. There is no evidence that the protein itself is overexpressed. Meric et al (Molecular Cancer Therapeutics (2002) 1:971-979) in a discussion of regulation of gene activity in cancer notes that "Gene expression is quite complicated, however, and is also regulated at the level of mRNA stability, mRNA translation and protein stability (page 971, column 1)." So Meric teaches that there is not necessarily a correlation between mRNA levels and protein

levels in cancer cells, since the regulation may occur at levels other than that of the mRNA, such as in the level of translation of the mRNA or in the stability of the protein.

The absence of any necessary correlation between increased mRNA levels and increased protein levels is made explicit by Gokman-Polar (Cancer Research (2001) 61:1375-1381) who teaches "Quantitative reverse transcription-PCR analysis revealed that PKC mRNA levels do not directly correlate with PKC protein levels, indicating that PKC isozyme expression is likely regulated at the posttranscriptional/translational level (see abstract)." Gokman-Polar show in figures 6 and 7 that there is no increase in mRNA expression for any of the isozymes, while the protein is significantly overexpressed as shown by figures 4 and 5. This demonstrates that there is no relationship between mRNA levels and protein levels.

A further evidentiary showing is provided by Pennica et al (Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA (1998) 95:14717-14722) who shows that WISP-2 DNA was amplified in cancer cells but was actually demonstrated REDUCED RNA expression (see abstract). This provides additional evidence that there is no relationship between gene amplification and mRNA levels, since mRNA levels have no necessary correlation with gene amplification.

So not only is there no necessary connection between the level of protein in a cell and the amount of mRNA, but there is also no necessary correlation between the amount of DNA in a cell and the amount of mRNA. Therefore, any evidence by Applicant showing overexpression of one component does not provide utility for the protein itself.

Further, given the breadth of these claims which encompass 95% identical molecules, there is an abundance of evidence that very similar proteins can perform very different functions. For example, Rost et al (J. Mol. Biol. (2002) 318(2):595-608) notes regarding assignment of enzymatic activity based upon homology comparisons that "The results illustrated how difficult it is to assess the conservation of protein function and to guarantee error-free genome annotations, in general: sets with millions of pair comparisons might not suffice to arrive at statistically significant conclusions (abstract)." Thus, even high levels of homology do not necessarily correlate with actual protein function. In the current case, where the function of PRO-539 (SEQ ID NO: 7) is not known, the expectation is even lower that there is any utility that can be derived based upon the sequence.

This situation is extremely similar to example 12 of the Utility Guidelines, where a protein which was known to be a receptor, but where the ligand was unknown, was found to lack utility. In the current case, the putative PRO-539 protein, lacks any substantial utility whatsoever, and solely relies upon an small level of mRNA overexpression in cancer cells. However, there is no necessary relationship between the protein levels or utilities and such an overexpression of the nucleic acid. So this case is similar to the receptor in Example 12, since it lacks a substantial utility because there is no "real world" context of use. Further research would be required to identify and reasonably confirm a "real world" context of use for PRO-539. As noted in the utility guidelines, basic research on a product to identify properties and intermediate

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products which themselves lack substantial utility are all insubstantial utilities (see page 6 of the Utility guideline training materials).

### **Specific Utility**

In the current case, even if the substantial utility argument above were found unpersuasive, there is no specific utility given for this PRO-539 protein of SEQ ID NO: 7. The protein, as distinguished from the nucleic acid, has not been associated with any disease, any condition, or any other specific feature. There is no association of the protein with cancer or with any other disease. As the utility guideline training materials note on page 5-6, "Similarly, a general statement of diagnostic utility, such as diagnosing an unspecified disease, would ordinarily be insufficient absent a disclosure of what condition can be diagnosed". Here, the overexpression of the nucleic acid gives no specific utility because it is entirely unrelated to uses of the protein. A protein cannot be used to detect changes in its cognate nucleic acid, as shown by the Gokman-Polar and Meric papers, where protein levels are not correlative with nucleic acid levels. Therefore, there is no specific utility for this protein until a specific ligand is identified.

Finally, with regard to the utility analysis, the current situation directly tracks Examples 4 and 12 of the utility guidelines, where a protein of entirely unknown function and a receptor with an unknown ligand was characterized as lacking utility.

### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112***

4. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

5. Claims 35, 37-40 and 46-54 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

In analysis of the claims for compliance with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, the written description guidelines note regarding genus/species situations that "Satisfactory disclosure of a ``representative number" depends on whether one of skill in the art would recognize that the applicant was in possession of the necessary common attributes or features of the elements possessed by the members of the genus in view of the species disclosed." (See: Federal Register: December 21, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 244), revised guidelines for written description.)

All of the current claims encompass a genus of proteins which are different from those disclosed in the specification, since the claims are not limited to any particular SEQ ID NO, but are open to a protein that ranges from 95% to 99% identical to SEQ ID NO: 7, without any guidance on conserved portions of the protein structure.

Most significantly, the genus includes variants for which no written description is provided in the specification. This large genus is represented in the specification by only the particularly named SEQ ID No 7. Thus, applicant has express possession of only one particular amino acid sequence in a genus which comprises hundreds of millions of different possibilities. Here, no common element or attributes of the sequences are disclosed, not even the presence of certain domains.

There is no showing or evidence which links structural limitations or requirements to any particular functional limitations. Further, these claims encompass alternately spliced versions of the proteins, allelic variants including insertions and mutations, inactive precursor proteins which have a removable amino terminal end, and only specific nucleic and amino acid sequences have been provided. No written description of alleles, of upstream or downstream regions containing additional sequence, or of alternative splice variants has been provided in the specification.

It is noted in the recently decided case The Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co. 43 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997) decision by the CAFC that

"A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169- 71, 25 USPQ2d at 1605- 06 (discussing Amgen). It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what achieves that result. Many such genes may achieve that result. The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See *In re Wilder*, 736 F.2d 1516, 1521, 222 USPQ 369, 372- 73 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming rejection because the specification does "little more than outlin[e] goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate."). Accordingly, naming a type of material generally known to exist, in the absence of knowledge as to what that material consists of, is not a description of that material. "

In the current situation, the definition of the nucleic acids as having 95%-99% sequence identity to SEQ ID NO: 7 lacks any specific structure, since it lacks the correlation between structure and function that is at the heart of the caselaw and of the written description guidelines.

It is noted that in Fiers v. Sugano (25 USPQ2d, 1601), the Fed. Cir. concluded that

"...if inventor is unable to envision detailed chemical structure of DNA sequence coding for specific protein, as well as method of obtaining it, then conception is not achieved until reduction to practice has occurred, that is, until after gene has been isolated...conception of any chemical substance, requires definition of that substance other than by its functional utility."

The current situation is a definition of the compound without identifying the structure function relationship of the compound, so that the compound is claimed solely its protein sequence related 80%-99% to SEQ ID NO: 7 without any correlative function to delimit the structure.

In the instant application, certain specific SEQ ID NOs are described. Also, in Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar (19 USPQ2d 1111, CAFC 1991), it was concluded that:

"...applicant must also convey, with reasonable clarity to those skilled in art, that applicant, as of filing date sought, was in possession of invention, with invention being, for purposes of "written description" inquiry, whatever is presently claimed."

In the application at the time of filing, there is no record or description which would demonstrate conception of any proteins other than those expressly disclosed which comprise SEQ ID NO 7. Therefore, the claims fail to meet the written description requirement by encompassing sequences which are not described in the specification.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 – Scope of Enablement***

6. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 27-35, 37-40 and 46-54 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention.

Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure meets the enablement requirement of 35 USC 112, first paragraph, have been described by the court in *In re Wands*, 8 USPQ2d 1400 (CA FC 1988). *Wands* states at page 1404,

“Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation have been summarized by the board in *Ex parte Forman*. They include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.”

The nature of the invention

The claims are drawn to a PRO-539 protein which is 95-100% identical to SEQ ID NO: 7. The invention is in a class of invention which the CAFC has characterized as “the unpredictable arts such as chemistry and biology.” *Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co.*, 243 F.3d 1316, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

The breadth of the claims

The claims broadly encompass not only the particular PRO-539 protein but also include any protein which shares 95% sequence identity to SEQ ID NO: 7.

Quantity of Experimentation

The quantity of experimentation in this area is extremely large since there is significant variability in the activity of polypeptides and nucleic acids. It would require significant study to identify the actual function of the PRO-539 protein and nucleic acid, and identifying a use for this protein would be an inventive, unpredictable and difficult undertaking in itself. This would require years of inventive effort, with each of the many intervening steps, upon effective reduction to practice, not providing any guarantee of success in the succeeding steps.

The unpredictability of the art and the state of the prior art

The art is extremely unpredictable with regard to protein function in the absence of reliable information regarding the protein activity. Even very similar proteins, as shown by homology, may have very different functions (see Rost et al (J. Mol. Biol. (2002) 318(2):595-608). In the current case, where no specific information is known regarding the function of the protein in actual biological organisms, it is entirely unpredictable what function and activity will be found for this protein. The prior art does not resolve this ambiguity, since no prior art activity is identified for the protein.

This data further lacks any of the hallmarks of utility or of any enabled use because the overexpression of the nucleic acid is not relevant to the utility of the protein. There is no evidence that the protein itself is overexpressed. Meric et al

(Molecular Cancer Therapeutics (2002) 1:971-979) in a discussion of regulation of gene activity in cancer notes that "Gene expression is quite complicated, however, and is also regulated at the level of mRNA stability, mRNA translation and protein stability (page 971, column 1)." So Meric teaches that there is not necessarily a correlation between mRNA levels and protein levels in cancer cells, since the regulation may occur at levels other than that of the mRNA, such as in the level of translation of the mRNA or in the stability of the protein.

The absence of any necessary correlation between increased mRNA levels and increased protein levels is made explicit by Gokman-Polar (Cancer Research (2001) 61:1375-1381) who teaches "Quantitative reverse transcription-PCR analysis revealed that PKC mRNA levels do not directly correlate with PKC protein levels, indicating that PKC isozyme expression is likely regulated at the posttranscriptional/translational level (see abstract)." Gokman-Polar show in figures 6 and 7 that there is no increase in mRNA expression for any of the isozymes, while the protein is significantly overexpressed as shown by figures 4 and 5. This demonstrates that there is no relationship between mRNA levels and protein levels.

A further evidentiary showing is provided by Pennica et al (Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA (1998) 95:14717-14722) who shows that WISP-2 DNA was amplified in cancer cells but was actually demonstrated REDUCED RNA expression (see abstract). This provides additional evidence that there is no relationship between gene amplification and mRNA levels, since mRNA levels have no necessary correlation with gene amplification.

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So not only is there no necessary connection between the level of protein in a cell and the amount of mRNA, but there is also no necessary correlation between the amount of DNA in a cell and the amount of mRNA. Therefore, any evidence by Applicant showing overexpression of one component does not provide utility for the protein itself.

So it is entirely unpredictable how one would use this protein in any context whatsoever.

#### Working Examples

The specification has no working examples that relate to the protein. The nucleic acid working examples, showing overexpression in certain cancer cell lines, are not relevant for the reasons given above. Specifically, there is no statistical showing that the overexpression of the nucleic acids is even significant in any way. Even if the nucleic acid data is deemed significant, there is no showing that the results from nucleic acids have any correlation with the protein and the art cited above demonstrates that there is no presumption of such a correlation..

#### Guidance in the Specification.

The specification provides no specific or substantial uses for the PRO-539 protein. The specification does generically teach that the protein may be used in further research, such as in generation of antibodies, but provides no specific and substantial use for the protein.

#### Level of Skill in the Art

The level of skill in the art is deemed to be high.

### Conclusion

Thus given the broad claims in an art whose nature is identified as unpredictable, the unpredictability of that art, the large quantity of research required to define these unpredictable variables, the lack of guidance provided in the specification, the presence of a working example which does not address the issue of the efficacy of the control and the negative teachings in the prior art balanced only against the high skill level in the art, it is the position of the examiner that it would require undue experimentation for one of skill in the art to perform the method of the claim as broadly written.

### ***Response to Arguments***

7. Applicant's arguments filed March 8, 2005 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

Applicant argues a set of case law distinct from *Brenner v. Manson*. This caselaw argument is not persuasive for several reasons.

### **Utility and Enablement Issues**

#### **Fundamental Utility Caselaw as applied to PRO539**

First, as discussed previously, in analyzing utility, the first place to begin is with the decision of the Supreme Court in *Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 148 USPQ 689 (1966). In *Brenner*, the Court concluded that "[t]he basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point-where specific benefit exists in currently available

form-there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field." *Id.* at 534-35, 148 USPQ at 695.

There is no specific benefit, in currently available form, for the Pro-539 protein and antibody, since there are no specific and substantial utilities for that Pro-539 protein and antibody.

The CCPA first applied *Brenner* in *In re Kirk*, 376 F.2d 936, 153 USPQ 48 (CCPA 1967). The invention claimed in *Kirk* was a set of steroid derivatives said to have valuable biological properties and to be of value "in the furtherance of steroidal research and in the application of steroidal materials to veterinary or medical practice." *Id.* at 938, 153 USPQ at 50. The claims had been rejected for lack of utility. In response, the applicants submitted an affidavit which purportedly "show[ed] that one skilled in the art would be able to determine the biological uses of the claimed compounds by routine tests." *Id.* at 939, 153 USPQ at 51. The court held that "nebulous expressions [like] 'biological activity' or 'biological properties'" did not adequately convey how to use the claimed compounds. *Id.* at 941, 153 USPQ at 52. Nor did the applicants' affidavit help their case: "the sum and substance of the affidavit appear[ed] to be that one of ordinary skill in the art would know 'how to use' the compounds to find out in the first instance whether the compounds are-or are not-in fact useful or possess useful properties, and to ascertain what those properties are." *Id.* at 942, 153 USPQ at 53. The *Kirk* court held that an earlier CCPA decision, holding that a chemical compound meets the requirements of § 101 if it is useful to chemists doing research on steroids, had effectively been overruled by *Brenner*. "There can be no doubt that the insubstantial,

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superficial nature of vague, general disclosures or arguments of 'useful in research' or 'useful as building blocks of value to the researcher' was recognized, and clearly rejected, by the Supreme Court" in Brenner. See Kirk, 376 F.2d at 945, 153 USPQ at 55.

The current situation is identical to that in Kirk. The Declarations filed provide evidence that one could determine whether the Pro-539 protein is useful, but do not even show any utility specifically for Pro-539 as discussed above. Further, the discussion cited by Applicant of the various declarations, such as the discussion on page 16 of the response, clearly represent language which is "useful in research" but has no current practical use. The speculation by the Declarants that medical practitioners might wish to know if proteins in general are overexpressed, without reference to Pro-539 in particular, is precisely the sort of vague argument which lacks any specificity.

There is no particular therapy associated with overexpression of the Pro-539 protein. There is no particular diagnosis associated with overexpression of the Pro-539 protein. There is no particular use whatsoever associated with overexpression of the Pro-539 protein and resultant antibody. There are only vague general statements that such an overexpression might be useful in research or therapy. This is insufficient according to the Kirk court. This is particularly demonstrated when Applicant argues that the proteins might be useful for tissue typing (see page 17). This is a classic throwaway utility since there is no evidence that Pro-539 protein is associated with any particular tissue at all.

Similarly, with regard to specific utility, the declaration, the arguments and the specification are entirely silent on any real specific utility for Pro-539. When Applicant states that evidence of overexpression of PRO539 nucleic acids provides utility to the protein, this presumes the protein is similarly overexpressed. As discussed at length above, this is not necessarily the case. Consequently, this cannot serve as a foundation stone to support specific utility.

#### **Applicants cited caselaw**

Applicant first cites Fujikawa v. Wattanasin for the proposition that utility need be shown only to a “reasonable certainty” and absolute proof is not required. This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, as evidenced by the art such as Pennica and Konopka, even if the the “reasonable probability” standard is used, there is no reasonable certainty that a protein will be overexpressed when the nucleic acid is expressed.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the case is really inapposite to the current situation because the utility question is significantly different. In Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, the question was whether in vitro testing that showed a compound lowered cholesterol provided utility for that compound as confirmed by in vivo testing. In the current case, no in vivo results whatsoever are present. The use of the Fujikawa compound is expressly evident from the results, that is, the compound can be used to treat high cholesterol, and that is the use intended by that applicant. That situation is significantly different from the current case because there is no evidence that the Pro-539 protein is diagnostic of cancer. Unlike the in vitro testing in Fujikawa v. Wattanasin,

where a positive result provided an indication that the compound was potentially useful in cholesterol lowering, and which result was confirmed by in vivo testing, a positive result of overexpression in lung cancer for the Pro-539 nucleic acid provides very little information for utility of the nucleic acid. There is no "reasonable probability" that the nucleic acid would be diagnostic of cancer in any way, and significantly less than a "reasonable probability" for the Pro-539 protein for which no evidence of utility whatsoever is presented. Antibodies to the Pro-539 protein, which protein has not been shown to be overexpressed in cancer or to have any other use, lack any "reasonable probability" of utility. Consequently, the fact pattern of *Fujikawa v. Wattanasin* does not apply because the level of certainty in this case is below the "reasonable probability" required by that CAFC in that decision.

This is similar to the cited *Cross v. Iizuka* case where specific inhibition of thromboxane synthetase was demonstrated for utility of the compounds. This is worlds apart from the current situation where no result whatsoever is shown for the claimed antibodies to Pro-539. No therapeutic or functional utility is even alleged other than the concept that the antibodies may detect the Pro-539 protein, for which no evidence of any utility has been provided. The closest asserted utility is for the Pro-539 nucleic acid, and this utility, for the reasons extensively discussed in the rejection, above and previously, does not carry over into the protein.

The conclusion that is reached is that it is NOT more likely than not that there is a "reasonable probability" that the asserted utility for the antibodies is true.

### **Nonspecific Arguments**

Applicant then cites a series of art sources for the entirely nonspecific argument that for some proteins, nucleic acid overexpression is correlated with protein overexpression. As noted in the rejection, there are other articles which demonstrate that there is no necessary relationship for every protein. Nonspecific arguments do not relate to PRO-539. None of the references demonstrate that there is a "reasonable probability" that the Pro-539 protein is overexpressed or that antibodies to the Pro-539 protein itself have any utility.

It is interesting that Applicant relies upon two cases, Fujikawa v. Wattanasin and Cross v. Iizuka, where specific evidence of utility for the specific molecules was presented, but Applicant fails to provide such evidence for Pro-539 and attempts instead to rely upon other, unrelated proteins. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin and Cross v. Iizuka both seem to stand for the proposition that is consonant with Brenner v. Manson, which is that specific evidence of utility for the specific molecule claimed is required. That specific evidence is absent and the conclusion is inescapable that the antibodies to Pro-539 therefore lack utility and this conclusion is maintained.

### **Written Description issues**

The first issue is whether the claims comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph. In this analysis, Applicant attempts to address the structure function issue by adding the function "wherein the nucleic acid encoding the polypeptide is overexpressed in lung or colon tumor cells". This function has literally nothing to do with structure whatsoever and does not address the concern

of the guidelines to have a function which delimits the sequence. Appellant also fails to note that a “representative number of species” is required. This is considered by the USPTO written description guidelines which note that in an unpredictable art, a single species is not sufficient to describe the genus.

It is the absence of any real structure function relationship and the absence of a representative number of species which supports the conclusion that there is insufficient descriptive support for the current claims. This argument rests on three grounds. First, the single sequence that is actually described is not representative of the genus of any sequence which hybridizes under the stated conditions. Second, the claims entirely lack a structure function relationship since the function given has no ability to limit the genus of polypeptides.

### Absence of a representative number of species

In the current case, the first question is what constitutes a generic claim. The genus of nucleic acids which encode polypeptides represents every possible variation which could occur in SEQ ID Nos: 7, that has 95% identity to the 830 amino acid protein. In order to provide a representative number of species, in a genus which contains literally  $20^{42}$  (or written out fully, approximately 439,804,651,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000) different members, the court in Lilly required “A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation of a representative number of cDNAs, defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within the scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to the members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial

Applicant appears to also be making the argument that the size of the genus is not relevant. This is not found persuasive because the size of the genus is a central issue. If the genus were small, a written description rejection would be less likely, since the examples would be more representative of the genus. Here, where the genus includes 439,804,651,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 different members, literally trillions and trillions of possible molecules, none of which are disclosed or taught by Applicant, the argument that the demonstrated species is representative is not found persuasive.

**Absence of any structure-function relationship**

Second, when Applicant relies upon the analysis of the written description guidelines, this analysis is based upon the assumption that there will be insubstantial variation, as noted in many of the examples including example 9. However, Applicant's analysis is flawed since there is no expectation in the instant case of insubstantial variation because the functional limitation devolves on reductase activity. This is not like example 9, where the functional limitation involved a protein which retained adenylate cyclase activity. Adenylate cyclase is an enzyme with a defined substrate leading to an expectation that stringently hybridizing proteins which retained the specific function of stimulating adenylate cyclase would differ insubstantially. Applicant's fundamental position fails to equate with the written description guidelines because in the guidelines, there is function correlated to the structure. The "overexpression in lung or colon tumor cells" function in Applicant's claims, however, lacks sufficient correlation with the structure of the protein since the specific changes imposed by the structure are not identified. So consonant with the case law in Lilly, Enzo and the other written description decision of the Federal Circuit, it is clear that the current claims fail to meet the written description requirement because there is no structure function relationship which limits the genus size. The guidelines require more. They require a structure function relationship where the function results in insubstantial variation in the structure.

So the claims clearly encompass sequences which were neither taught nor described by the current specification. The claims include a single species which is not

representative of the full scope of the genus. Therefore, the written description rejection is maintained.

### ***Conclusion***

8. All claims are drawn to the same invention claimed in the application prior to the entry of the submission under 37 CFR 1.114 and could have been finally rejected on the grounds and art of record in the next Office action if they had been entered in the application prior to entry under 37 CFR 1.114. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL** even though it is a first action after the filing of a request for continued examination and the submission under 37 CFR 1.114. See MPEP § 706.07(b).


Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Jeffrey Fredman whose telephone number is (571)272-0742. The examiner can normally be reached on 6:30-3:00.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Gary Benzion can be reached on (571)272-0782. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

  
Jeffrey Fredman  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 1637

9/2/05